William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 3

Article 7

2009

Juvenile Transfer: From "Get Better" to "Get
Tough" and Where We Go from Here
Emily A. Polachek

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Polachek, Emily A. (2009) "Juvenile Transfer: From "Get Better" to "Get Tough" and Where We Go from Here," William Mitchell
Law Review: Vol. 35: Iss. 3, Article 7.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Polachek: Juvenile Transfer: From "Get Better" to "Get Tough"? and Where We

JUVENILE TRANSFER: FROM “GET BETTER” TO
“GET TOUGH”AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE
Emily A. Polachek †
I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................... 1163
II. THE CHANGING JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ......................... 1165
A. History of the Juvenile Justice System ................................ 1165
B. From Rehabilitation to Retribution ................................... 1167
1. Procedural Changes ................................................... 1167
2. The Mythical Youth Violence Epidemic ....................... 1169
III. JUVENILE TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT ............................... 1170
A. “Get Tough” Measures ................................................... 1170
1. Judicial Waiver ......................................................... 1171
2. Statutory Exclusion.................................................... 1172
3. Prosecutorial Discretion .............................................. 1172
4. Blended Sentencing .................................................... 1173
B. Minnesota Transfer Laws................................................ 1174
1. Certification to District Courts .................................... 1174
2. Statutory Exclusion.................................................... 1176
3. Extended Jurisdiction ................................................. 1177
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF JUVENILE
TRANSFER ............................................................................. 1178
A. Current Trends in Juvenile Transfer ................................ 1178
B. Juvenile Transfer Does Not Deter Delinquency ................... 1179
C. Anti-Therapeutic Effects of Juvenile Transfer .................... 1181
1. Procedural Disenfranchisement ................................... 1182
2. Victimization and Rehabilitation ................................ 1182
3. Post-Release Consequences of Incarceration.................. 1183
V. PSYCHOLOGY’S POTENTIAL ROLE AND OTHER
RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................ 1183
A. Psychology Should Aid Juvenile Waiver Decisions.............. 1183
1. Clarification of Kent Criteria ..................................... 1184
† J.D. Candidate 2010, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Psychology,
summa cum laude, Creighton University, 2007. The author thanks Jill Kingsbury,
Dr. Matthew Huss, and the William Mitchell Law Review staff for their insight and
assistance in editing this article.

1162

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 7

2009]

JUVENILE TRANSFER

1163

2. Risk Assessments........................................................ 1185
a. Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version (PCL:YV).... 1186
b. Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth
(SAVRY)............................................................. 1187
c. Risk-Sophistication-Treatment Inventory (RST-I) .. 1187
3. Areas of Improvement for Risk Assessments.................. 1188
B. Abolish Statutory Exclusion and Prosecutorial Direct File .. 1190
C. Improve Communication Between Psychology and the Law 1192
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1193
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 15, 2005, Matthew Niedere murdered his parents,
Peter and Patricia Niedere, at their auto glass store in Hastings,
1
Minnesota. Niedere planned and committed the murders with his
2
friend, Clayton Keister. Both Niedere and Keister were seventeen
3
According to
years old when they killed Niedere’s parents.
Niedere’s testimony, he shot his father multiple times with a
4
semiautomatic pistol until the gun ran out of bullets. Niedere’s
mother attempted to escape the fray, but Keister chased her back
5
into the store and murdered her. The boys planned the attack two
weeks in advance during whispered conversations in physics class at
Concordia Academy, a private Lutheran school in Roseville,
6
Minnesota. After the murders, Niedere and Keister ran errands
1. Attorney: Teens Got Ready for Dance After Murders, WCCO NEWS, Oct. 12,
2005,
http://wcco.com/topstories/Matthew.Niedere.Clayton.2.351831.html
[hereinafter WCCO].
2. Id.; Jim Adams, Two Teens, Two Tales of Hastings Murders, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), June 2, 2006, http://www.startribune.com/local/11584826.html.
3. WCCO, supra note 1.
4. See Adams, supra note 2 (“‘If there were more bullets would you have fired
again?’ Backstrom asked. ‘Yes,’ Niedere replied quietly.”).
5. Id. According to reports, Mrs. Niedere initially attempted to save herself,
but returned to the shop to drag her husband’s body from the melee. Id. Despite
the apparent brutality of the slaying, Keister claimed he initially refused to aid
Niedere, but relented after Niedere promised to pay Keister $15,000 and
threatened to kill Keister’s family if the other boy did not join in the plot. Id.
During his testimony, Keister claimed that it was the threat against his family,
rather than the monetary incentive, that convinced him to go through with the
plan. Id. Keister also testified that money inspired Niedere’s plan to kill his
parents; after reading his parents’ will, Niedere believed they had assets exceeding
one million dollars. Id.
6. Id.; WCCO, supra note 1. At one point, eighteen-year-old Jamie C. Patton
joined in the plan, but he was not present at the time of the shootings. Adams,
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and dressed for the homecoming dance.
The adolescents faced several criminal charges, including
premeditated murder, which carries a mandatory life sentence
8
without the possibility of parole. In accordance with Minnesota
9
law, Dakota County Attorney James Backstrom brought the case in
10
The State of Minnesota watched with bated
criminal court.
11
breath to discover whether the prosecutor would lock Niedere
and Keister up and throw away the key, or further exercise his
12
discretion and offer a more lenient plea. Despite protest from
some members of the Niedere family, Niedere and Keister each
pled guilty to two counts of aiding first-degree murder while
13
attempting to commit aggravated robbery. They will be eligible
14
for parole in 2035, thirty years from the date of sentencing.
The Niedere family’s conflicting views are unsurprising given
the current state of juvenile justice and punishment. This article
supra note 2. Patton was charged with two counts of conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder. WCCO, supra note 1.
7. WCCO, supra note 1.
8. Adams, supra note 2.
9. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2006) (discussed infra Part III.B).
10. Sharon Cohen, Prosecuting Kids as Adults: Some States Ponder Changes, USA
TODAY, Dec. 2, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-01tryingkids_N.htm.
11. Several other juvenile transfer cases gained similarly spectacular media
coverage and national attention in the past decade. Eleven-year-old Nathaniel
Jamal Abraham became the youngest American charged with first-degree murder
as an adult. See Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at which Juveniles
Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State
Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 785 (2000). Abraham broke into a house,
stole a rifle, practiced his aim on balloons and streetlights, shot two men, and then
bragged about his actions. People v. Abraham, 599 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999). In Florida, twelve-year-old Lionel Tate beat a six-year-old to death.
Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Tate was tried in
criminal court and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. Id. Lastly, the school shootings at Jonesboro, Columbine, and Red Lake
received a great deal of media attention and painted juvenile offenders as
merciless and untreatable. See Deanie C. Allen, Trying Children as Adults, 6 T.G.
JONES L. REV. 27, 28 (2002).
12. See Cohen, supra note 10 (“‘I had to make a very difficult decision
whether to put these young men away for their natural lives, or give them a
chance,’ Backstrom says.”).
13. Adams, supra note 2.
14. Cohen, supra note 10. However, Backstrom did not seem optimistic about
the teens’ prospects for achieving parole. See id. (“‘As I told them at sentencing,
they’re going to have to show more remorse than they did when they pled guilty,’
[Backstrom] says. ‘If that’s the case 30 years from now, then we’ll give them a
chance in society.’”).
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explores the evolution of the juvenile justice system and the
corresponding implications for youthful offenders and society at
large. The article begins with an overview of both the historical
15
and current development of the juvenile justice system. Part III
discusses the current juvenile transfer laws, exploring Minnesota
16
law as an example of current legislative trends in juvenile transfer.
Next, the article highlights several factors that make current
transfer provisions ineffective, including the weight of transfer
decisions and the effects of criminal incarceration on adolescents
17
and society. Finally, Part V looks at the current state of transfer
and suggests methods for reducing the anti-therapeutic
consequences of juvenile transfer, the most important of which is
18
the adoption of psychological risk assessments.
II. THE CHANGING JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. History of the Juvenile Justice System
Beginning with the inception of English common law in the
Middle Ages, the law recognized that juvenile offenders are a
19
unique population. However, in the early history of this country’s
criminal justice system, child offenders did not receive separate
20
adjudicative proceedings. The law treated all offenders the same,
regardless of their age. Exceptions to this presumption of
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts:
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 443 (1985). The
authors trace juvenile punishment to Hebrew Law as written in the Old
Testament. Id. at 442–43 (“Hebrew law, as reflected in Exodus, Deuteronomy, and
Leviticus, reflects a willingness to deal harshly with juveniles, including those who
engaged in conduct for which no adult would have been liable.”). Somewhat
more recently, the famous jurist Sir William Blackstone addressed the punishment
of juvenile offenders in capital cases in his commentaries, setting forth a system
that attached criminal responsibility to all offenders over the age of seven. See
David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 13, 13–14 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds.,
2000).
20. Kelly M. Angell, Note, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile Offenders Are
Treated as Adults, Nobody Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125, 127 (2004). See also
Ellie D. Shefi, Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating Waived Juveniles in Adult Correctional
Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 653, 656 (2003) (noting
that before 1899, the American criminal justice system lacked formal distinction
between juveniles and adults).
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culpability applied only to children under the age of seven, who
were considered “incapable of criminal intent or distinguishing
21
right from wrong.”
Scholars trace creation of the first American juvenile courts,
and the institution of a separate juvenile justice system, to the
22
Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899. The Act established separate
courts having jurisdiction over delinquents under the ages of either
fourteen or sixteen, and exclusive jurisdiction over children under
23
the age of seven. This system caught lawmakers’ attention, and by
24
1917, all but three states had established juvenile courts. In 1945,
juvenile courts existed in every jurisdiction in the country,
25
including the federal court system.
During the growth of the juvenile courts, a new theory of the
etiology of crime emerged, which viewed deviant behavior as a
“symptom of an underlying condition that required treatment”
26
This
instead of an act of evil that deserved to be punished.
jurisprudential shift coincided with the rise of developmental
27
psychology at the start of the twentieth century. Developmental
psychologists postulated that the “condition” underlying
delinquent juvenile behavior was poor parenting and other social
28
ills. This desire to “cure” social ills gave rise to the parens patriae
21. Angell, supra note 20, at 127 (quoting R. BARRI FLOWERS, KIDS WHO
COMMIT ADULT CRIMES: SERIOUS CRIMINALITY BY JUVENILE OFFENDERS 7 (Nathaniel J.
Pallone ed., 2002)). Juvenile offenders could also assert a defense of incapacity,
claiming that they did not have the capacity to commit the alleged criminal act.
Id. If the juvenile was successful, the court dismissed all charges and released the
child. Id. See also Gail B. Goodman, Note, Arrested Development: An Alternative to
Juveniles Serving Life Without Parole in Colorado, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1059, 1064
(2007) (explaining several rebuttable presumptions as to guilt and innocence that
were based on the offender’s age).
22. Goodman, supra note 21, at 1065.
Some scholars contend that
Massachusetts and New York were the first states to usher in juvenile courts with
laws passed in 1874 and 1892, respectively, which allowed separate trials for minor
defendants.
ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 9 (Univ. Chicago Press 1969).
23. Goodman, supra note 21, at 1065.
24. PLATT, supra note 22, at 10.
25. Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 19, at 451.
26. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137,
141 (1998).
27. Id. Developmental psychology studies the “physiological and cognitive
changes across the life span, and how these are affected by culture, circumstance,
and experience.” CAROLE WADE & CAROL TAVRIS, PSYCHOLOGY 502 (7th ed. 2003).
28. Scott & Grisso, supra note 26, at 142. In response to this theory, New York
instituted the House of Refuge in 1824. Goodman, supra note 21, at 1064. The
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29

principle toward juveniles. Therefore, the original juvenile courts
aimed to rehabilitate juvenile offenders through individualized
inquiry into the crime and the criminal, a goal that closely
30
paralleled research in developmental psychology. This ideal of
individual assessment and treatment served as the basis of the
rehabilitative model of the newly established juvenile courts.
B. From Rehabilitation to Retribution
1.

Procedural Changes

In an effort to emphasize the unique characteristics of the
juvenile offender, juvenile court hearings were originally intended
to be less formal and have different dispositional outcomes than
31
criminal courts. Judges exercised wide discretion in sentencing
with an aim to sentence youth to a punishment that fit the offender
32
rather than the offense. In the 1960s, concern over liberal use of
discretion led the Supreme Court to hand down a number of
landmark decisions setting out procedural safeguards for
33
delinquents tried in juvenile courts.
34
The first seminal juvenile justice case was Kent v. United States.
Morris Kent appealed the juvenile court’s decision to waive
35
jurisdiction of his trial. Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court
said that transfer provisions meant “the child receives the worst of
both worlds [because] he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
36
The Supreme Court held that it was
postulated for children.”
improper to transfer a juvenile “without ceremony—without
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement
House of Refuge was a residential facility for children who were “committed as
vagrants [and] were convicted of crimes by authorities.” Shefi, supra note 20, at
657.
29. Goodman, supra note 21, at 1065. Parens patriae literally translates to
“father of the country,” and refers to the doctrine that the sovereign state, in its
capacity as protector, provides assistance to those citizens who are unable to
protect themselves. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
30. Goodman, supra note 21, at 1065.
31. Scott & Grisso, supra note 26, at 143.
32. Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 377 (1998).
33. Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 19, at 453.
34. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
35. Id. at 548.
36. Id. at 556.
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of reasons.” In an appendix to the decision, the Court set forth
38
eight factors to serve as guidelines for transfer determinations.
The determinative factors can be summarized as: (1) the
seriousness of the offense; (2) whether it was a violent,
premeditated crime; (3) whether it was a crime against people or
property; (4) the strength of the case; (5) whether the offender’s
cohorts were adults; (6) the sophistication and maturity of the
youth; (7) the offender’s prior history; and (8) the probability that
39
the delinquent could be treated. As discussed below, the weight
afforded to these factors varies widely by jurisdiction.
A year after the Supreme Court ruled in Kent, it decided In re
40
In Gault, the Court reviewed the juvenile court’s nonGault.
adversarial proceedings and rejected them as less than
41
The Court determined that “unbridled discretion,
satisfactory.
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for
42
principle and procedure.” The Supreme Court ultimately held
that juvenile offenders had a constitutional right to the same
43
procedural safeguards that adult offenders enjoyed.
Although these Supreme Court decisions afforded juveniles
more procedural rights in the courtroom, juvenile proceedings also
44
became more adversarial. As Justice Blackmun wrote in McKiever
45
v. Pennsylvania, “[i]f the formalities of the criminal adjudicative
process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system,
46
there is little need for its separate existence.”

37. Id. at 554.
38. Id. at 566–67.
39. Id.
40. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. Id. at 14–18.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 19–55. These rights include the right to advance notice of charges,
the right to counsel, the right to confront accusers, and the right against selfincrimination. Id.
44. Goodman, supra note 21, at 1070.
45. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that juveniles charged with unlawful
conduct are not entitled to trial by jury).
46. Id. at 551. Commentators interpret Justice Blackmun’s words in one of
two ways, depending on their personal views of the juvenile system. Some critics
call for the abolishment of the juvenile system, while others advocate a return to
less formal juvenile hearings. See infra note 95 (discussing how Professor Barry
Feld of the University of Minnesota advocates to abolish the juvenile justice
system).
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The Mythical Youth Violence Epidemic

In addition to the changing procedural grounds, an increase
in juvenile crime levels sparked a shift from parens patriae to a crime
control model, which considers the protection of the public as
47
most important. These increases were both real and imagined.
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was an unsubstantiated belief that
48
In fact, overall
juvenile crime became more commonplace.
49
juvenile delinquency rates did rise between 1974 and 1981. This
increase continued steadily through the 1980s and the first half of
50
the 1990s. By the middle of the 1990s, the level and severity of
51
youth violence were major societal and political issues.
Beginning in 1994, just as the nation began to fear an
epidemic of youth violence, juvenile crime rates started to
52
decrease. Rather than reassuring the public that juvenile crime
was rapidly falling, the topic received even more media attention.
The nation’s preoccupation with juvenile delinquency stems from a
small percentage of truly horrific crimes that occurred in the
53
1990s. Driven by public outrage, crime control advocates adopted
54
The public
a campaign against the juvenile “super-predator.”
view of the juvenile offender as a dangerous super-predator did not
47. See, e.g., Jennifer M. O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Note, Getting Smart
About Getting Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1299, 1303 (1996); Jeffrey J. Shook, Contesting Childhood in the US
Justice System: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Criminal Court, 12 CHILDHOOD 461,
463 (2005).
48. See O’Connor & Treat, supra note 47, at 1304–05; see also DAVID L. MYERS,
BOYS AMONG MEN: TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS ADULTS 4 (2005)
(explaining that during the 1960s and 1970s the baby boomer population reached
its “crime-prone” years).
49. See Goodman, supra note 21, at 1072.
50. Beresford, supra note 11, at 785 (“From 1987 to 1994, the juvenile
population increased only 7%, but juvenile arrests for delinquency increased
79%.”).
51. MYERS, supra note 48, at 127.
52. Beresford, supra note 11, at 786.
53. See MYERS, supra note 48, at 5–6. Furthermore, the school shootings at
Jonesboro (1998) and Columbine (1999) occurred during this period, receiving
unprecedented publicity.
54. Shook, supra note 47, at 461–62. The pejorative term “super-predators”
refers to juveniles who commit violent and dangerous crimes. Id. The image of
the adolescent super-predator is one that politicians often use to highlight and
justify the murky line between adolescence and adulthood. Id. See also FRANKLIN
E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 11 (1998) (citing several lawmakers’
statements that 2010 will see “270,000 juvenile superpredators coming at us in
waves”).
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jive with the juvenile justice system’s goals of rehabilitation. In
1993, a Gallup Poll reported that approximately 73% of surveyed
56
In
adults favored harsher penalties for juvenile offenders.
response, public figures and politicians adopted a “get tough”
57
policy towards juvenile crime.
III. JUVENILE TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT
A. “Get Tough” Measures
One of the major planks of the “get tough” platform is the
proposition that juveniles who commit an “adult crime” should do
58
“adult time.” This now infamous slogan refers to the practice of
juvenile transfer to criminal court, or “the transfer of youth to the
59
Transfer is a severe
jurisdiction of the adult criminal court.”
sanction that can result in extended sentences, longer trials, and
60
felony convictions.
Juvenile transfer has always been a mechanism of the juvenile
61
justice system in the United States. Since 1978, every state has
62
enacted new legislation to ease juvenile transfer. These new laws
55. Klein, supra note 32, at 373–74 (citing former Attorney General John
Ashcroft’s statement that the juvenile justice system “reprimands the crime victim
for being at the wrong place at the wrong time, and then turns around and hugs
the juvenile terrorist, whispering ever so softly into his ear, ‘Don’t worry, the State
will cure you.’”).
56. MYERS, supra note 48, at 9. The Gallup Poll is a respected division of The
Gallup Organization that identifies and tracks various social and economic factors.
See Gallop Poll, http://www.gallup.com/poll/101905/Gallup-Poll.aspx (last visited
Feb. 28, 2009).
57. See Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 19, at 455; Scott & Grisso, supra note 26,
at 148; Klein, supra note 32, at 384.
58. Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution
that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 254 (2007) [hereinafter Feld (2007)].
59. Shook, supra note 47, at 461. Juvenile transfer is also called “waiver”
because the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction over the juvenile in question, or
“certification” for adult prosecution. Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes,
Determinants of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 314, 324 (1990) [hereinafter Fagan & Deschenes (1990)]; NAT’L.
CTR. JUV. JUST., TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE
TRANSFER AND BLENDED SENTENCING LAWS 4 (2003), http://www.ncjjservehttp.org/
NCJJWebsite/pdf/transferbulletin.pdf [hereinafter NCJJ STATE REPORT]. In
Minnesota, juvenile transfer is called “certification.” See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125
(2006). This article will use the terms “waiver” and “certification” interchangeably
as the label varies by jurisdiction.
60. Fagan & Deschenes (1990), supra note 59, at 325.
61. See id. at 324.
62. See id.; Goodman, supra note 21, at 1060.
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increased the number and variety of crimes eligible for transfer,
lowered or eliminated age restrictions on transfer, and gave
63
transfer authority to prosecutors and state legislatures. Expanded
transfer laws shifted the focus of the juvenile court from
rehabilitation towards “the goals of deterrence, retribution, and
64
incapacitation.” Currently, three methods exist for transferring
juveniles to criminal court: (1) judicial waiver; (2) statutory
65
exclusion; and (3) prosecutorial discretion.
1.

Judicial Waiver

When prosecuting a juvenile offender, a juvenile court judge
may decide that it is in society’s best interest to prosecute a serious
66
Judicial waiver is the most common
offense in criminal court.
path for transfer, and juvenile court judges in forty-eight states and
the District of Columbia have the option of waiving youth offenders
67
to criminal court. In the states that allow judicial waiver, statutes
usually require that the juvenile receives a hearing prior to
68
During this hearing to determine an offender’s
transfer.
suitability for transfer, judges must consider the guidelines set forth
69
in Kent, as well as any other criteria stated in the jurisdiction’s own
70
Legal and psychological scholars disagree
transfer provisions.
about the amount of discretion these provisions allow judges
71
during transfer determinations.

63. Shook, supra note 47, at 461.
64. Goodman, supra note 21, at 1070.
65. Randall T. Salekin, Richard Rogers & Karen L. Ustad, Juvenile Waiver to
Adult Criminal Courts: Prototypes for Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and
Amenability to Treatment, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 381, 382 (2001) [hereinafter
Salekin et al. (2001)].
66. Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 45, 45 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds.,
2000).
67. Fagan & Deschenes (1990), supra note 59, at 326.
68. Beresford, supra note 11, at 795.
69. See supra Part II.B.I (outlining the Kent guidelines).
70. Salekin et al. (2001), supra note 65, at 383.
71. Compare Klein, supra note 32, at 386 (“As a result of Kent and the factors
listed and incorporated into state statutes, judges do not possess unfettered
discretion . . . [but] must make explicit findings based on the described criteria.”),
with Salekin et al. (2001), supra note 65, at 383 (discussing the ambiguity of the
Kent criteria and the lack of research on how and to what degree courts apply the
factors).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/7

10

Polachek: Juvenile Transfer: From "Get Better" to "Get Tough"? and Where We

1172

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 35:3

Statutory Exclusion

Another way juvenile offenders enter the criminal courts is
through statutory exclusion.
In states exercising statutory
exclusion, juveniles of a certain age who commit certain crimes fall
72
outside the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the juvenile is
automatically charged in the criminal court without any judicial
73
input and without a transfer hearing.
Currently, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia allow
74
This process is more
statutory exclusion in juvenile transfer.
75
expedient and results in an increased number of transfers.
Furthermore, automatically sending adolescents to criminal court
based on singular factors, such as age or type of offense, makes it
easier for state legislatures to further increase the number of
76
transfers through simple criterion manipulation.
3.

Prosecutorial Discretion

The third method for juvenile transfer is prosecutorial
discretion, which allows prosecutors to file directly in either
77
juvenile or criminal court. Like statutory exclusion, there is no
transfer hearing, leading proponents of prosecutorial discretion to
78
Fifteen states allow prosecutors to file
promote its efficiency.
79
juvenile cases directly in criminal court.
Some states that allow statutory exclusion or prosecutorial
direct file also have a process called reverse waiver (or
decertification) whereby a juvenile court judge can reverse the
transfer decision and send the adolescent back to the juvenile

72. Dia N. Brannen et al., Transfer to Adult Court: A National Study of How
Juvenile Court Judges Weigh Pertinent Kent Criteria, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 332,
334 (2006).
73. Id.
74. Klein, supra note 32, at 390. In 1975, only four states and the District of
Columbia had statutes excluding juveniles from the juvenile justice system as
compared to the thirty-six states currently exercising statutory exclusion. Id.
75. Id. at 390, 395.
76. Allen, supra note 11, at 51–52. Scholars argue that this characteristic of
statutory exclusion and the possibility of harsher criminal penalties are “more
effective at achieving the popular goals of retribution, deterrence, and selective
incapacitation.” Klein, supra note 32, at 391.
77. Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 334. Prosecutorial discretion is also
known as “prosecutorial direct file.” See id.
78. Klein, supra note 32, at 395.
79. Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 334.
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80

court. This procedure provides a safety net for juvenile offenders
but requires a pretrial hearing on suitability for transfer to be
81
subject to judicial review.
4.

Blended Sentencing

Waiver provisions apply to the legal proceedings a juvenile
faces. Blended sentencing deals with the offender’s ultimate
82
disposition.
Blended sentencing laws allow juvenile courts to
83
These laws
sentence offenders to adult criminal sanctions.
84
function in one of two ways. First, in juvenile blended sentencing,
the juvenile court can impose a juvenile sentence as well as a
85
If the adolescent offender
suspended criminal sentence.
complies with the juvenile disposition and exercises good behavior,
86
he or she will remain in the juvenile justice system. If, however,
87
the offender is uncooperative, the criminal sanctions take effect.
88
Fifteen states have juvenile blended sentencing laws. Although
these provisions appear more lenient because they allow young
offenders to remain in the juvenile system, the practical application
of blended sentencing laws may increase offenders’ risk of serving
89
For example, Arkansas and Ohio apply juvenile
adult time.
blended sentencing laws to youth who would otherwise be
90
ineligible for transfer under state law.
Second, in criminal blended sentencing laws, criminal courts
may sentence transferred offenders to dispositions traditionally
91
reserved to the juvenile courts. Like juvenile blended sentences,
the juvenile disposition in criminal blended sentencing is
92
Seventeen
conditional on the offender’s cooperative behavior.
80. Id. Only twenty-five states have reverse transfer proceedings. Id.
81. Id. Reverse transfer is rare because judges are hesitant to overrule
another judge’s transfer determination. Id. at 334 n.2.
82. NCJJ STATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 1.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. The exact mechanics of this process vary by jurisdiction. This article
discusses the Minnesota blended sentencing laws. See infra Part III.B.
88. NCJJ STATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 2.
89. Id. at 12.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2. Therefore, juveniles who left the juvenile courts for adjudicatory
proceedings may nonetheless receive a juvenile sentence. Id.
92. Id. Criminal blended sentencing laws fall into two categories. Id. at 16.
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93

states have criminal blended sentencing laws.
Compared to
juvenile blended sentencing laws, criminal blended sentencing
seems more lenient because transferred youths may receive a
94
juvenile sentence, which is arguably more rehabilitative.
B. Minnesota Transfer Laws
1.

Certification to District Courts

In 1994, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the first version of
95
the modern transfer laws. Minnesota Statutes section 260B.125
96
Juvenile
lays out the current transfer, or certification, rules.
courts may certify offenders for prosecution in criminal court
through discretionary judicial waiver or presumptive judicial
97
waiver, depending on the age of the offender and the offense.
Certification at the court’s discretion is an option if: (1) the
offender was fourteen years of age or older at the time he or she
committed the offense, and (2) the offense would be a felony if
98
committed by an adult. In such instances, “the juvenile court may
enter an order certifying the proceeding for action under the laws
99
If
and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations.”
Exclusive blended sentencing “give[s] courts an either/or choice between juvenile
and adult sanctions.” Id. Ten states have this type of sentencing, making it the
most common version of criminal blended sentencing. Id. Inclusive blended
sentencing laws allow the courts to impose both sentences in some sort of
combination. Id.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 16. For more information on the negative effects of criminal
incarceration on juvenile offenders, see infra Part IV.
95. Act of May 5, 1994, ch. 576, § 13, 1994 Minn. Laws 638–641. Professor
Barry Feld of the University of Minnesota School of Law authored Minnesota’s
transfer laws. See Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to
Youth Violence, 24 CRIM. & JUST. 189, 237 (1998). Some scholars hail Professor Feld
as the “new master narrative of the twentieth-century juvenile justice.”
Tanenhaus, supra note 19, at 14. Interestingly, Professor Feld advocates for the
abolition of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Symposium, Abolish
the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997) (arguing that the juvenile justice system should
combine with the criminal justice system and age should be addressed in the
sentencing phase).
96. MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2006).
97. Id. See also NCJJ STATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 3 (providing a chart of
states’ avenues for sending juvenile offenders to criminal court, including waiver
laws, statutory exclusion, direct file, blended sentencing, and “once an adult,
always an adult” statutes).
98. § 260B.125, subdiv. 1.
99. Id.
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the prosecutor moves for certification under section 260B.125, the
court must hold a hearing to determine the offender’s suitability
100
for transfer within thirty days of the motion’s filing. To obtain an
order for certification, the prosecution must demonstrate probable
cause that the juvenile actually committed the alleged offense, and
must show by clear and convincing evidence that “retaining the
101
proceeding in juvenile court does not serve public safety.”
At first glance, this provision appears to ignore the Supreme
102
However, the statute defines
Court’s guiding factors from Kent.
“public safety” more broadly than the vernacular.
When
considering whether certification will serve the public safety, the
court must weigh the following factors: (1) the seriousness of the
alleged offense; (2) the juvenile’s culpability for the crime as
evidenced by the child’s level of participation and planning; (3)
any prior record; (4) the juvenile’s prior history of treatment,
including willingness to participate in treatment programs; (5) the
“adequacy of the punishment or programming available in the
juvenile justice system;” and (6) the dispositions available to the
103
individual offender.
Two aspects of these factors provide evidence of the punitive
nature of Minnesota’s certification laws. First, when weighing the
certification factors, the statute calls for the court to give the most
weight to the seriousness of the charge and the juvenile’s prior
104
Second, although the statute conceptualizes “public
record.
safety,” this definition lacks reference to the individual
105
The court may, on its own
characteristics of the offender.
initiative or upon request of counsel, order “social, psychiatric, or
106
psychological studies” relevant to the juvenile’s certification. But
the only requirement for the content of these studies is that they
reference the public safety factors listed in section 260B.125,
subdivision 4, and address the dispositional options available to the
100. Id., subdiv. 2.
101. Id.
102. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966).
103. § 260B.125, subdiv. 4.
104. Id.
105. See id. Noticeably absent from the Minnesota factors is the Kent factor of
the sophistication and maturity of the offender. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.
106. MINN. R. JUV. P. 18.04, subdiv. 1 (2007). Although the statute does not
require that the court order a psychological evaluation, almost all juveniles
undergo some form of evaluation as part of the discretionary certification process.
Telephone interview with Catherine McPherson, Head of Operations, Anoka
County Attorney’s Office, in Anoka, Minn. (Jan. 16, 2009).
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107

court.
Therefore, even mental health professionals are not
required to assess the juveniles’ personal characteristics.
In addition to certification through judicial discretion, there is
a presumption that the court will certify certain individuals for
adjudication in the district courts. Presumptive certification
applies if the juvenile was sixteen or seventeen years old at the time
he or she committed the crime, and the alleged offense would
result in either a prison sentence under the sentencing guidelines
108
If
or a felony conviction if an adult had committed the offense.
presumptive certification applies and there is probable cause that
the juvenile committed the alleged offense, the juvenile court will
waive jurisdiction unless the juvenile rebuts, by clear and
convincing evidence, the presumption that certification serves the
109
public safety.
2.

Statutory Exclusion

Although Minnesota does not allow prosecutorial direct file,
the legislature did enact a limited provision for statutory
110
Rather than enacting a law that explicitly certified
exclusion.
certain adolescents for prosecution in criminal court, the
legislature excluded specific offenders from the definition of a
111
After reaching the age of sixteen,
“delinquent child.”
adolescents who allegedly committed murder in the first degree are
112
This is a very narrow
not considered delinquent children.
exception, however, as the statute still considers offenders charged
with committing attempted murder in the first degree after
reaching sixteen years of age to be delinquent children for the
113
purposes of certification.
107. MINN. R. JUV. P. 18.04(2) (2007).
108. § 260B.125, subdiv. 3.
109. Id. The juvenile must address the same public safety factors that apply in
discretionary judicial waiver. Id., subdiv. 4.
110. See NCJJ STATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 3.
111. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b) (2006). Minnesota Statutes
section 260B.125 only applies to offenders falling within this definition.
§ 260B.125, subdiv. 1.
112. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b). See also MINN. R. JUV. P. 18.01(2).
113. § 260B.007, subdiv. 6(b). Recall from the Introduction that the Dakota
County Attorney brought the case against Niedere and Keister directly to criminal
court. See Cohen, supra note 10. Although Minnesota does not allow prosecutorial
direct file, prosecutors do have some discretion when charging juveniles.
Therefore, a prosecutor can achieve the same result as direct file by charging an
offender with first-degree murder.
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Extended Jurisdiction

In ordinary juvenile prosecutions, the juvenile justice system
loses jurisdiction to incarcerate offenders over the age of
114
nineteen. In 1995, Minnesota adopted its own version of juvenile
blended sentencing called extended jurisdiction juvenile (“EJJ”)
115
EJJ gives juvenile courts dispositional jurisdiction
prosecutions.
116
In EJJ prosecutions, the
until the offender turns twenty-one.
court may also impose a stayed criminal sentence that may be
executed if the juvenile violates any conditions of the juvenile
117
The court may impose EJJ prosecutions on juveniles
sentence.
118
Juveniles aged
who qualify for presumptive certification.
fourteen to seventeen years who underwent a transfer hearing are
119
The court may also
also eligible for EJJ at the court’s discretion.
grant EJJ for a juvenile aged fourteen to seventeen upon the
prosecution’s request and subsequent showing, by clear and
120
Although
convincing evidence, that EJJ serves public safety.
Minnesota lawmakers intended EJJ prosecutions to be an
intermediate measure between retention in the juvenile system and
114. Feld (2007), supra note 58, at 242.
115. See id. at 241; MINN. STAT. § 260B.130 (2006).
116. Feld (2007), supra note 58, at 242.
117. See id.; see also § 260B.130, subdiv. 4(a).
118. § 260B.130, subdiv. 1. An example of EJJ with a juvenile who qualifies for
presumptive certification occurred in the October 10, 2008 kidnapping and brutal
beating of Justin Hamilton, a twenty-four-year-old man with developmental
disabilities. See Frederick Melo, After Cruel Beating, Victim Lives in Terror, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Oct. 17, 2008, at A1 [hereinafter Cruel Beating]; Frederick
Melo, On MySpace, They’re So Boyishly Ordinary, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.),
Oct. 18, 2008, at B1. Natasha Dahn, a sixteen-year-old who purported to be
Justin’s friend, lured Hamilton to the kidnappers after telling them that Hamilton
sexually assaulted her. Cruel Beating, at A7. Because Dahn was sixteen years old at
the time she committed felonious crimes, she was eligible for presumptive
certification. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 3 (2006). Dakota County
Attorney James Backstrom, who prosecuted the Niedere case, described supra
notes 2–14, initially filed a motion to certify Dahn as an adult. News Release,
Office of Dakota County Attorney, Juvenile Pleads Guilty in Attack Upon
Vulnerable Adult (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.co.dakota.mn.us/NR/rdonlyres/
00002790/gzwvyxagqvyosaevxlmijwgkrvbtocem/DahnCertPlea.pdf.
Dahn pled
guilty to two counts of kidnapping, assault in the third degree, and aggravated
robbery. Id. Dahn received a stayed adult sentence of ninety-six months, and will
remain in the custody of the juvenile court until she reaches the age of twenty-one.
Id. Backstrom cites Dahn’s troubled childhood, mental state, and previous
victimization as reasons not to certify Dahn. Id. at 2–3.
119. § 260B.130, subdiv. 1.
120. Id., subdivs. 1–2. Again, the statute refers to the same public safety factors
laid out in Minnesota Statutes section 260B.125, subdiv. 4 (2006).
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certification, they have not proved as successful as child advocates
121
expected.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF JUVENILE TRANSFER
States enacted juvenile transfer laws as a response to the public
perception that violent juvenile crime was growing at an alarming
122
Legislators assumed that imposing criminal sanctions on
rate.
youthful offenders would deter other juveniles from committing
similarly violent crimes and would punish the offenders themselves
123
in a manner that better fit the severity of the crime.
But the
effectiveness of these laws is questionable for several reasons. First,
current trends in juvenile transfers show that courts do not reserve
transfer solely for the most violent offenders.
Second,
developmental psychologists showed that a clear factor in juvenile
crime is impulsive behavior that leads to a delinquent act, which
means juvenile offenders do not consider the potential
consequences of their actions when they commit an offense.
Finally, incarcerating children in adult prisons has devastating
effects on the juvenile offenders well beyond the realm of just
punishment.
A. Current Trends in Juvenile Transfer
A sociological study in 1996 estimated that 210,000 to 260,000
children under the age of eighteen are tried in criminal court every
124
These numbers
year as a result of the new transfer procedures.
are staggering when viewed in comparison with the 12,600 transfers
125
Although the new methods
that occurred nationwide in 1978.
for transfer send more juveniles to criminal court, studies suggest
126
Rather
these adolescents are not the most serious offenders.
121. See John M. Stuart & Amy K. R. Zaske, What Does a “Juvenile Adjudication”
Mean in Minnesota? Some New Answers After a Century of Change in Juvenile Court, 32
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 919, 938–41 (2006) (outlining the political arguments
surrounding EJJ laws and the effect on Minnesota juveniles).
122. See Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an
Ideological Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999).
123. See id. at 260–61.
124. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27
CRIME & JUST. 81, 97 (2000) [hereinafter Bishop (2000)].
125. Shook, supra note 47, at 466. More specifically, transfers increased by
68% between 1988 and 1992. Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 333.
126. See Shook, supra note 47, at 466; see also Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at
98.
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than transferring juveniles who committed violent crimes against
127
persons, at least 40% of the waived cases were property crimes.
In Florida, only 29% of delinquents transferred in the late 1970s
128
Current transfer
committed crimes against another person.
129
At
statistics also show a secondary effect on race and gender.
present, “[o]lder, male, nonwhite, and poor juveniles from urban
130
areas continue to represent the majority of waived adolescents.”
This statistic prompted many critics of transfer laws to question
whether waiver is simply the latest form of racial profiling and
131
discrimination.
Additionally, the increased rate in juvenile crime in the early
1990s does not necessarily mean more children became criminals.
Several longitudinal studies established that approximately 6% of
childhood offenders matured into criminals responsible for 50% of
132
Therefore, it is unnecessary to lock up more children
all crime.
to quell the public’s perception that more kids are becoming
killers.
B. Juvenile Transfer Does Not Deter Delinquency
Lawmakers intended juvenile transfer to have a deterrent
effect on youths who learned of their peers serving time in adult
133
prisons. This goal directly contradicts the literature on child and
adolescent development.
Developmental psychology research
shows minors to be “more impulsive, to have less capacity for selfcontrol, and to be more inclined to focus on immediate rather
127. Shook, supra note 47, at 466; see also Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at 98
(“Historically, more juveniles were waived for property offenses than for crimes
against persons. Since 1993, more person than property crimes have been waived,
but person offenses still make up fewer than half of judicial waivers.”). Other
studies show that 46% to 55% of transferred cases involved property offenses.
Beresford, supra note 11, at 794.
128. DAVID BRANDT, DELINQUENCY, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 77–78
(2006).
129. See generally Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II:
Race and the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327 (1999) [hereinafter
Feld (1999)] (discussing the effects of “get tough” crime policies on race).
130. MYERS, supra note 48, at 127.
131. See generally Feld (1999), supra note 129 (questioning the staggering
statistics on transferred minorities).
132. Gina M. Vincent, Psychopathy and Violence Risk Assessment in Youth, 15
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 407, 407 (2006).
133. RICHARD E. REDDING, OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 2 (2008),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
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134

than long-term consequences of their choices.”
The American
justice system often considers the amount of control a defendant
had over his or her actions when assigning criminal
135
Adolescent traits such as impulsivity and
responsibility.
susceptibility to peer pressure suggest that juvenile offenders have a
136
diminished capacity to understand and control their actions.
The Supreme Court recognized this issue in the recent case of
137
Roper v. Simmons. The court refused to impose the death penalty
on a juvenile offender based on research from several prominent
psychologists that demonstrated children’s lack of maturity,
138
susceptibility to negative influences, and malleable personality.
These traits account for a lack of control over one’s actions, and
therefore prevent punitive measures from serving as a deterrent.
Delinquent behavior stemming from impulsive acts will not cease
due to the availability of harsher penalties. A juvenile on the cusp
of committing a crime will not pause to consider the possibility that
he or she may serve an adult prison sentence as a result of his or
her behavior. Therefore, juvenile transfer laws are ineffective
deterrent measures.
Recent juvenile crime statistics are unclear on the deterrent
effect of transfer laws. As discussed above, juvenile crime rates rose
139
in the 1980s and early 1990s. A sharp decrease in youth violence
140
Proponents of juvenile transfer
followed from 1994 until 2004.
may attribute this decrease to the enactment and improvement of
transfer provisions; however, the decade-long decline in juvenile
141
The juvenile arrest rate for violent crimes
crime ended in 2004.
142
Despite
increased by 2% in 2005 and an additional 4% in 2006.
the recent increases, the juvenile crime rates for all offense types

134. Scott & Grisso, supra note 26, at 147.
135. See generally Abraham Rudnick & Amihay Levy, Personality Disorders and
Criminal Responsibility: A Second Opinion, 17 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 409 (1994)
(exploring the logical syllogism that allows courts to afford individuals diminished
criminal responsibility due to lack of control over behavior and the rationality of
the crime).
136. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 26, at 147.
137. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
138. Id. at 569–70.
139. See supra Part II.B.2.
140. HOWARD N. SNYDER, OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
JUVENILE ARRESTS 2006 1 (2008), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/
221338.pdf.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 4.
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It is therefore
remain well below the levels seen in the 1990s.
unclear whether juvenile transfer laws had a marked effect on
juvenile crime rates.
C. Anti-Therapeutic Effects of Juvenile Transfer
The most recent psychological research shows that transfer
laws do not even deter those juveniles who do serve criminal
sentences. Criminal incarceration is the final blow in the “get
tough” policy towards juvenile crime. As of 1998, forty-four states
incarcerated juveniles in adult facilities, and only eighteen of these
144
states housed the youth offenders in separate facilities. However,
many studies show that imprisoning juvenile and adult offenders
together leads to greater youth recidivism, thereby frustrating the
145
This recidivism may be a result of
original goal of public safety.
procedural disenfranchisement, a lack of rehabilitative resources in
146
prison, and victimization in prison.

143. Id. at 6–7.
144. MYERS, supra note 48, at 99–100.
145. See Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at 130. Bishop and her colleagues
conducted several studies of juveniles in adult correctional facilities that gained
worldwide notoriety. See id.; Donna M. Bishop, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce & Charles E.
Frazier, Juvenile Justice Under Attack: An Analysis of the Causes and Impact of Recent
Reforms, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129 (1998); Charles E. Frazier, Donna M.
Bishop, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce & Amir Marvasti, Juveniles in Criminal Court: Past and
Current Research from Florida, 18 QLR 573 (1999); Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Charles E.
Frazier & Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Transfers in Florida: The Worst of the Worst?, 10
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277 (1999). Cumulatively, the researchers interviewed
hundreds of male offenders in Florida who were prosecuted in juvenile court, as
well as those transferred to criminal courts. Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at 132.
Much of the information in this section comes from the researchers’ comparisons
between the responses of each population. Although these studies reflect solely
the views of male offenders, it is important to remember that over 90% of
transferred youths are male. See infra note 175 (indicating a 93.3% of male
juvenile offenders).
146. MYERS, supra note 48, at 100; Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at 141–47;
Shefi, supra note 20, at 664. Additionally, it is important to note that there may be
a sample selection problem when discussing the recidivism rates of transferred
youth. Assuming arguendo that juvenile transfer laws send the most dangerous
offenders to criminal court, these juveniles may be more likely to recidivate
regardless of where they serve their sentence. However, at least one study found
that for juveniles who committed the same crime but served different sentences, a
greater period of time elapsed between release and re-arrest for the offenders who
remained in the juvenile system. Howard Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Transfer, in
READINGS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 172, 183 (Barry C. Feld ed., 1999).
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Procedural Disenfranchisement

Juvenile offenders transferred to adult courts reported
different experiences than their counterparts in juvenile court
147
during the adjudication process.
Transferred youth felt the
criminal court was formal, rushed, and that the court had no
148
Youths also found the
interest in the offender as a person.
criminal proceeding more difficult to understand and expressed
149
These perceptions resulted
distrust towards appointed counsel.
in the offenders’ belief that they did not receive a fair trial and left
150
the adolescents frustrated and angry with the justice system.
2.

Victimization and Rehabilitation

Once they arrive in prison, juvenile offenders face more
aggravation. Paramount is a high level of victimization and
151
Juveniles in adult facilities reported more
psychological distress.
weapons assaults, sexual violence, and physical altercations than
152
their counterparts in juvenile detention centers. Juveniles live in
constant fear of harm, causing many youths to report poor
153
psychological health, including greater anxiety and depression.
Unlike juvenile detention facilities, prisons have less, if any,
treatment options, counseling services, or educational and
154
This presents a distinct problem for
professional opportunities.
incarcerated youth, who will more than likely reenter society at
some point and be expected to live as productive members of their
155
Rather than learning essential skills for life after
communities.
prison, juvenile inmates reported learning new crime techniques
147. Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at 135–36.
148. Id. at 136. In comparison, juvenile offenders who remained in juvenile
court reported that “judges had interacted with them personally during court
proceedings and expressed interest in their problems and concern for their wellbeing.” Id. These individuals believed the juvenile court had each youth’s best
interests at heart. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 136–37.
151. Id. at 145–46.
152. Id. Juvenile offenders face a greater risk for institutional violence in
prisons because not only are the juveniles obvious targets, but sexual and physical
abuse occurs more frequently in adult facilities. Shefi, supra note 20, at 664.
153. Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at 146. Juveniles in prisons experience
greater mental health issues than the adult population; juvenile inmates are eight
times more likely to commit suicide. Shefi, supra note 20, at 664.
154. Shefi, supra note 20, at 664.
155. Id.
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156

Post-Release Consequences of Incarceration

When the prisons become too crowded, as they are today,
juvenile convicts are among the first released because they are
considered less dangerous than the adults; therefore, these
juveniles may actually serve shorter and less punitive sentences as a
157
Juvenile offenders reenter society as semiresult of transfer.
citizens. Unlike juvenile court records, which are sealed, criminal
convictions are a matter of public record and youth must report
158
The more
them on all academic and employment applications.
difficult it is for a juvenile to find a stable job, the more likely he
159
Additionally, individuals with criminal records
will recidivate.
lose many civil liberties such as the right to vote, hold office, join
160
the military, or even to sit on a jury.
Given these harsh restrictions and stigmatization, it is not
surprising that transferred offenders are more likely to reoffend
more quickly, frequently, and severely than their peers held in
161
This higher rate of recidivism suggests that
juvenile court.
transferring juveniles may increase juvenile crime, which is directly
162
opposite to the effect that policymakers intended.
V. PSYCHOLOGY’S POTENTIAL ROLE AND OTHER
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Psychology Should Aid Juvenile Waiver Decisions
Violence risk assessments are probabilistic estimates of
163
Risk
violence based on individual and situational factors.
assessments take the form of clinical interviews, structured
164
In these interviews or actuarial
interviews, or actuarial measures.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 665.
158. Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at 148.
159. Id. There is a negative correlation between stable employment and
criminal activity. Id.
160. Id. Ironically, juvenile ex-convicts lose these liberties before they ever had
an opportunity to exercise these privileges. Shook, supra note 47, at 472–73.
161. Bishop (2000), supra note 124, at 150–52.
162. See MYERS, supra note 48, at 100.
163. Richard Rogers, The Uncritical Acceptance of Risk Assessment in Forensic
Practice, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 595, 595 (2000).
164. John Monahan, Actuarial Support for the Clinical Assessment of Violence Risk, 9
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tools, mental health professionals analyze the presence or absence
of factors that make it more or less likely that the subject will
165
engage in violent conduct in the future. These evaluations differ
from traditional clinical instruments because they attempt to
describe an individual’s behavior rather than simply present a
166
diagnosis.
1.

Clarification of Kent Criteria

In order to create a risk assessment instrument, psychologists
must know what factors are indicative of violence. Although the
factors the Supreme Court set out in Kent provided guidelines for
judges and even prosecutors, when making decisions about which
cases to transfer to adult court, many courts remain unclear on the
167
application of these factors.
Researchers conducted several
studies to clarify these constructs.
First, scholars grouped the Kent factors into three main
constructs: (1) potential dangerousness; (2) sophistication and
maturity of the juvenile; and (3) the individual’s amenability to
168
treatment. Next, another study further explored these constructs
by asking clinical psychologists to rate the prototypicality of items
169
Participating
related to each of the three constructs.
psychologists reported that items relating to antisocial behavior and
leadership roles in crime best characterized the dangerousness
170
Criminal sophistication, premeditation of the crime,
construct.
and an understanding of social norms and alternatives to crime
were the highest rated items relating to the sophistication-maturity

INT’L. R. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167 (1997).
165. Id.
166. Thomas Grisso, Forensic Clinical Evaluations Related to Waiver of Jurisdiction,
in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 321, 322 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin
E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter Grisso (2000)].
167. Salekin et al. (2001), supra note 65, at 383. For example, many state
statutes concerning the dangerousness criteria “do not define the standard
beyond a brief phrase that identifies it, such as ‘protection of the community,’
‘danger to public,’ or ‘public safety.’” THOMAS GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF
JUVENILES 201 (1998). As discussed in Part III.B.1., Minnesota certification statutes
repeatedly use the term “public safety,” but this phrase is not present in the
definitions relating to the statute. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.007 (2006).
168. Salekin et al. (2001), supra note 65, at 383. Notice that the Minnesota
factors considered for public safety do not include amenability treatment. See
MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 4 (2006).
169. Salekin et al. (2001), supra note 65, at 387.
170. Id. at 397.
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171

construct.
Lastly, items relating to motivation to change and
172
familial support defined the amenability to treatment construct.
When these psychologists made mock transfer decisions using these
constructs, they were more likely to transfer individuals rated
moderately high in dangerousness, and moderately low in both
173
sophistication-maturity and amenability to treatment.
After clarifying the Kent constructs, the researchers turned
their attention to the legal system’s use of the Supreme Court’s
transfer guidelines. One study asked juvenile court judges to
describe an actual youth each judge personally waived to criminal
court whom the judge believed to be representative of most
174
Judges reported that transferred juveniles tended
transfer cases.
to rate high in dangerousness and low in amenability to
175
Typical traits of the transferred youth included the
treatment.
use of weapons, behavioral problems in multiple settings,
knowledge of the consequences of deviancy, crimes of extreme
violence, premeditation, and failure to accept responsibility for the
176
crime.
2.

Risk Assessments

Clarifying the Kent criteria and their application in transfer
decisions may provide psychologists with insight in another
important area related to juvenile waiver to criminal court. When
an individual receives a transfer hearing, judicial officers often rely
on experts to identify juveniles who possess the constructs discussed
177
Responding to the legal system’s call for assistance,
above.

171. Id.
172. Id. at 397–98.
173. Id. at 399.
174. Randall T. Salekin et al., Juvenile Transfer to Adult Courts: A Look at the
Prototypes for Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and Amenability to Treatment
Through a Legal Lens, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 373, 379–80 (2002) [hereinafter
Salekin et al. (2002)].
175. Id. at 401–02. Additionally, the average age of the transferred youth was
15.98 years (standard deviation (SD) = 1.10 years) and the average education level
was 9.13 years (SD = 1.12 years). Id. at 394–95. The vast majority (93.3%) of the
juvenile offenders were male. Id. at 395. Thirty percent of juvenile offenders were
white, and 70% were minorities. Id.
176. Id. at 396.
177. Salekin et al. (2001), supra note 65, at 381. See also THE WORKSHOP ON
PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE IN THE JUVENILE COURT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE
IN THE JUVENILE COURT (1992) (providing a comprehensive guide to the various
roles psychology and psychiatry play in the juvenile court system).
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psychologists developed several juvenile risk assessments.
a.

[Vol. 35:3
178

Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version (PCL:YV)

Traditionally, psychologists assessed juvenile risk using adult
179
scales that were revised for use with adolescents.
One such
180
measure is the Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version (PCL:YV).
The PCL:YV assesses psychopathic traits associated with adolescent
181
It is therefore unsurprising
risk and amenability to treatment.
that high PCL:YV scores have a statistically significant correlation
with criminal versatility, violent and aggressive behavior, increased
182
The predictive
recidivism rates, and treatment noncompliance.
validity of the PCL:YV makes it a useful tool in identifying violent
183
juvenile offenders.
It is important to consider psychopathy instruments because
juvenile court judges consider this factor demonstrative of
184
dangerousness. Furthermore, several psychological studies found
statistically significant correlations between scores on adult
185
In fact, compared
psychopathy measures and violent recidivism.
178. The assessments described infra are only a sample of the numerous
instruments available to measure risk in juveniles. There is no standard
evaluation; therefore, there is no single correct way to assess risk. Grisso (2000),
supra note 166, at 331–32. Risk assessments vary widely, but usually incorporate
general risk factors such as past aggressive behavior, family conflict, and mental
disorders. Id. at 338–40.
179. Vincent, supra note 132, at 408.
180. ADELLE E. FORTH, DAVID S. KOSSON & ROBERT D. HARE, THE HARE
PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST: YOUTH VERSION (PCL:YV)—RATING GUIDE (1997).
Psychopathy is a personality disorder marked by various interpersonal, affective,
and behavioral traits. Zina Lee et al., The Validity of the Antisocial Process Screening
Device as a Self-Report Measure of Psychopathy in Adolescent Offenders, 21 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 771, 771 (2003). The PCL:YV is a version of the Psychopathy Checklist—
Revised (PCL-R), the most popular and validated psychopathy instrument, revised
for youth ages 12 to 17. Id. at 772. It is important to note that the PCL and its
adaptations are not risk assessments. Professionals use the instrument to diagnose
psychopathy, which happens to correlate with violent behavior. See infra note 181
(explaining why violence correlates with psychopathy). Although this is a subtle
distinction, it plays an important role in psychological literature.
181. Raymond R. Corrado et al., Predictive Validity of the Psychopathy Checklist:
Youth Version for General and Violent Recidivism, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5, 6–7 (2004).
Specifically, the predictive power of the PCL:YV stems from the psychopathic
constructs of impulsivity and stimulation-seeking behavioral traits. Id. at 19.
182. Id. at 18; Lee et al., supra note 180, at 773; Vincent, supra note 132, at 420.
183. Id.
184. Salekin et al. (2002), supra note 174, at 398.
185. See generally Stephen D. Hart, Robert D. Hare & Adelle E. Forth,
Psychopathy as a Risk Marker for Violence: Development and Validation of a Screening
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to other risk factors, psychopathy is the single best predictor of
186
Nevertheless, many researchers
violence in male offenders.
caution that adolescent personalities are not static enough to
187
Furthermore, psychopathy is
support a psychopathy diagnosis.
only one factor in assessing dangerousness in juvenile offenders.
Other scales are available to assess a juvenile’s risk of generalized
violence.
b.

Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)

The Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth
188
(SAVRY) is a structured professional judgment risk assessment
189
created for an offender population. The SAVRY is an empirically
based interview that uses professional judgment to assess the
190
applicability and importance of various factors. After completing
a structured interview, the forensic evaluator gives the offender an
191
The
ultimate risk assessment score of low, medium, or high.
SAVRY examines both risk and protective factors and allows for
192
These features of the assessment allow
professional discretion.
for an individualized evaluation of the offender, which aligns with
193
the goals of the juvenile justice system.
c.

Risk-Sophistication-Treatment Inventory (RST-I)

Like the instruments discussed above, most risk assessments
fail to examine juvenile offenders’ maturity levels or amenability to
Version of the Revised Psychopathy Checklist, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER 81, 81–
100 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994) (outlining the findings in
several studies with various versions of the Psychopathy Checklist, the Psychopathy
Checklist Revised, and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version).
186. See JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT 96–97 (2001).
187. Lee et al., supra note 180, at 772 (“Adolescence is a developmental time
marked by changes in cognition, identity, and socialization.”).
188. Randy Borum, Patrick A. Bartel & Adelle E. Forth, Structured Assessment of
Violence Risk in Youth, in MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE 311, 311 (Thomas Grisso, Gina Vincent & Daniel Seagrave eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Borum et al.].
189. Vincent, supra note 132, at 422.
190. Borum et al., supra note 188, at 313.
191. Id. at 313–15.
192. Id. Risk factors are static and dynamic variables that make an individual’s
propensity for violence more likely, such as a history of violence, stress, and
impulsivity. Id. at 313–14. In contrast, protective factors are static variables that
decrease an individual’s probability of committing future violent acts, such as
prosocial involvement, strong support systems, and academic achievement. Id.
193. Id. at 320.
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194

treatment.
Those assessments that do address the constructs
195
The
were not designed for use with a delinquent population.
196
Risk-Sophistication-Treatment Inventory (RST-I) fills this gap in
the available instruments. Randall T. Salekin and his colleagues
created the RST-I specifically to aid the juvenile court system in
197
The
decisions concerning juvenile transfer to criminal court.
RST-I uses the transfer guidelines from Kent to measure an
individual’s risk of future violence, cognitive and emotional
198
When comparing the
maturity, and amenability to treatment.
RST-I scores of offenders retained in the juvenile court and those
waived to the criminal system, transferred juveniles consistently
scored higher on the Risk for Dangerousness and Sophistication199
Maturity scales, and lower on the Amenability to Treatment scale.
3.

Areas of Improvement for Risk Assessments

Although the above risk assessments have high predictive and
internal validities, they do have some limitations. The most blatant
limitation is the dearth of information on validity in minority and
200
Other than the RST-I, the risk assessments
female populations.
201
discussed above refer to modified adult scales. Some researchers
question whether these risk assessments adequately address the
malleability of children and the developmental factors that may
202
affect the predictive validity of long-term risk assessments.
194. Salekin et al. (2001), supra note 65, at 401–02.
195. Id.
196. Randall T. Salekin, Karen L. Salekin, Carl B. Clements & Anne-Marie R.
Leistico, Risk-Sophistication-Treatment Inventory, in MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND
ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 341, 341 (Thomas Grisso, Gina Vincent & Daniel
Seagrave eds., 2005).
197. Id. at 342.
198. Id. The instrument measures each of these three constructs with three
scales of fifteen items. Id. at 343. Raw scores for each of the nine clusters relate to
a normative sample and the individual receives a rating of low, medium, or high
for each of the three constructs. Id. Despite the novelty of the RST-I, the
instrument received high reliability and validity scores. Id. at 348–50.
199. Id. at 350.
200. See generally Grisso (2000), supra note 166 (providing extensive statistical
information on transferred youths). The lack of research on minority populations
is especially concerning given the large number of transferred minority youth. See
MYERS, supra note 48, at 127.
201. Vincent, supra note 132, at 410.
202. Id. at 423–24. These researchers are also hesitant to label a juvenile with
loaded terms, such as “psychopath,” when theories of developmental psychology
stress the malleability of youth. Id. at 423.
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Because both transfer laws and the clarification of Kent criteria are
recent developments, researchers have not tracked recidivism into
adulthood, which may also affect the instruments’ predictive
203
validities.
In addition to the issues inherent in the risk assessments
themselves, it is questionable whether the law accepts psychology’s
input. One study asked judges from the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges to make transfer decisions for
juveniles in hypothetical cases with differing levels of
dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to
204
The study revealed that the level of dangerousness
treatment.
and sophistication-maturity influenced transfer decisions, but the
205
This
juvenile’s potential responsiveness to treatment did not.
finding is puzzling because, at another point in the study, the same
judges cited the court’s goal of rehabilitation as a reason to keep
206
Additionally, several judges expressed
youths in juvenile court.
frustration with psychologists’ transfer reports, raising doubts as to
207
whether the courts used these reports in their decision.
Just as psychology and juvenile justice evolved simultaneously,
there was a correlation between the improvement of risk
assessments and the amount of use they received in court. The
Supreme Court first addressed the use of risk assessments in
208
Barefoot v. Estelle, when the court expressed both skepticism of the
validity of risk assessments and a hope for their future
209
In a prompt response to the Court’s decision,
improvement.
mental health professionals conducted extensive research to
210
Since that
increase the predictive validity of risk assessments.
time, risk assessments underwent several generational evolutions,
211
Undoubtedly, with more
becoming increasingly predictive.
203. Id. at 417.
204. Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 338–39.
205. Id. at 347.
206. Id. at 348.
207. Id. at 345. The judges’ comments included that the reports “[d]o not
provide rehabilitation and treatment options” but “should be comprehensive and
extensive” and “[s]ome are pretty vague.” Id.
208. 463 U.S. 880 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521
U.S. 320 (1997).
209. Id. at 898.
210. Randy K. Otto, Prediction of Dangerous Behavior: A Review and Analysis of
“Second-Generation” Research, 5 FORENSIC REPS. 103, 103 (1992).
211. Id. at 103–04. Research on “first generation” risk assessments showed that
“psychiatrists and psychologists [were] accurate in no more than one out of three
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direction and encouragement from the courts, this trend will
continue.
B. Abolish Statutory Exclusion and Prosecutorial Direct File
Criminal incarceration produces harsh results for both the
212
Statistics show that property
transferred youth and society.
213
offenses comprise a majority of transferred cases.
Clearly,
transfer provisions are not reserved solely for the worst offenders,
and transferring more juveniles than originally intended only
increases the number of released convicts who will later recidivate.
Psychological risk assessments can aid courts in transferring only
those juveniles who present a serious risk to the community and are
not amenable to treatment. In addition to improving the validity of
risk assessments, pervasive implementation of risk assessments
requires mandatory transfer hearings and education for members
of the legal and psychological fields. The following measures may
achieve these goals.
First, the legal system must decide whether the goal of the
practice is to transfer juveniles with adult qualities or to transfer
214
offenders with the aim that they will receive adult punishments.
As long as the answer is not exclusively the latter, it seems
reasonable to abolish statutory exclusion and prosecutorial direct
file. Statutory exclusion and prosecutorial direct file make transfer
decisions based solely on the offender’s age and crime committed
215
without considering biographical or contextual information.
216
Such
These methods of waiver reduce adulthood to a single act.
a simplification flies in the face of decades of psychological
research relating to child and adolescent development, as well as
the fundamental principle of the juvenile justice system, which sees
217
youth as highly malleable individuals.
predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period.” JOHN MONAHAN, NAT’L
INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 47–49
(1981). In “second generation” risk assessments, predictive validity increased to at
least 50% accuracy. Otto, supra note 210, at 121. Psychologists are now in the
third generation of risk assessments and validity is still increasing. Id.
212. See supra Part IV.
213. See supra Part IV.
214. See Shook, supra note 47, at 468 (summarizing the shift from the
rehabilitative model of juvenile justice to the current crime control model).
215. Id. at 465.
216. Id. at 473.
217. Id. at 463. See also Klein, supra note 32, at 393 (“Statutory exclusion is a
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Furthermore, juveniles transferred to adult court through
statutory exclusion or prosecutorial direct file may not appeal these
218
Commentators also question the constitutionality of
decisions.
statutory exclusion and direct file, saying that every juvenile should
be afforded “the same due process guarantee to a [transfer]
219
The
hearing before the state can charge him as an adult.”
abolishment of statutory exclusion and direct file would achieve
this guarantee, as well as the certainty that a juvenile judge would
220
preside over the hearing.
The latter guarantee addresses concerns about the propriety of
prosecutorial direct file given that a prosecutor’s duty is to the state
221
This obligation may encourage prosecutors to
and its security.
222
overcharge juveniles in an effort to appear tough on crime.
Rather than focusing solely on the state’s interests, it is the job of
223
the juvenile court judges to rule in the best interests of the child.
Additionally, judges are likely familiar with the needs of the
224
individual and can make more informed transfer determinations.
When asked about the various methods of transfer, a vast majority
225
of judges from the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges believed a return to case-by-case judicial transfers would
226
Therefore, many legal
have positive implications for youth.
227
228
229
professionals, judicial officers, and psychologists call for an
complete abandonment of an offender-based, treatment-oriented system in favor
of one that is offense-based and punishment-oriented.”).
218. Klein, supra note 32, at 395.
219. Allison Boyce, Choosing the Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v.
State, 46 ARK. L. REV. 985, 1008 (1994).
220. Id. at 1009.
221. Id. at 998.
222. Id. at 1008.
223. Id. at 1002.
224. See id.
225. Seventy-two percent of judges polled advocated a return to judicial waiver.
Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 346.
226. Id. These judges cited the “checks and balances” built into the system to
counter arguments of arbitrary judicial transfer decisions. Id.
227. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Symposium, Transfer of
Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 301 (1991) (questioning whether prosecutors
have enough professional and life experience to make difficult, unilateral transfer
decisions).
228. See, e.g., Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 345 (quoting a judge’s answer to
an open-ended question that “[t]rained and experienced judges know more than
the legislature and the public regarding which youths should be transferred to
adult courts.”).
229. See Salekin et al. (2001), supra note 65, at 403.
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abolition of statutory exclusion and prosecutorial direct file.
C. Improve Communication Between Psychology and the Law
Dr. Randall Salekin, creator of the RST-I, suggests the
adoption of a national transfer standard, made up of the Kent
230
Although this may be
factors and a method for balancing them.
impractical on such a large scale, the Minnesota certification laws
231
provide a fair example of how to incorporate the Kent factors and
232
States could also require
a balancing test into state legislation.
that a mental health professional assess the juvenile offender as a
233
part of the transfer hearing. Incorporating such laws will require
court officials to pay attention to the latest psychological research
on child and adolescent development, risk assessment, and
treatment options in order to make well informed decisions in
transfer hearings.
In tandem, psychologists must continue to develop and
validate risk assessments, particularly with young minority and
234
Clinicians need to deviate from a purely
female populations.
academic track and infiltrate the legal and political forces. Such
action requires that researchers become familiar with the legal
235
Social scientists should attempt to
standards at issue in the law.
publish relevant articles in a wider range of publications.
Additionally, judges, attorneys, and psychologists need to be on the
236
To achieve this goal,
same page about the transfer process.
psychologists should provide training for individuals in the legal
237
profession with reference to applicable research. Along the same
lines, mental health professionals should educate judges about the
mechanics of the risk assessments and the significance of certain
230. Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 349 (“[S]cientists, legal scholars, and
legislators should (a) further develop definitions of the criteria for transfer, (b)
know something about how to weigh them, and (c) refine transfer mechanisms to
reflect fairness.”).
231. As previously mentioned, the statute does not include consideration of
the juveniles’ sophistication and maturity. See supra Part III.B.1; MINN. STAT.
§ 260B.125, subdiv. 4 (2006).
232. See Salekin et al. (2002), supra note 174, at 404; § 260B.125, subdiv. 4.
233. Admittedly, it is unknown among social scientists how often and in what
capacity courts use transfer evaluations. See Grisso (2000), supra note 166, at 331–
32.
234. Vincent, supra note 132, at 411.
235. Grisso (2000), supra note 166, at 323.
236. Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 349.
237. Salekin et al. (2002), supra note 174, at 405.
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238

measures.
Most importantly, those who prepare reports for the
239
court must use layman’s terms.
If legal and mental health
professionals take these, or similar steps, the two fields may be able
to mutually improve the treatment of juveniles in the justice system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The juvenile justice system experienced a dramatic evolution
from its origins in rehabilitative ideals to “get tough” policies. As
part of this shift, legislators in almost every jurisdiction enacted new
laws to increase the number of juvenile offenders transferred to
criminal court. Although these laws are more retributive, they also
present several problems and ignore the relevant psychological
literature. In order to combat these potential inefficiencies, the
juvenile justice system should require the use of risk assessments in
transfer hearings, eliminate direct file and statutory exclusion, and
educate the legal and psychological communities on the needs and
abilities of each field.

238. Brannen et al., supra note 72, at 345. Such education should be
undertaken as a response to judges’ beliefs that “[m]any reports simply ‘parrot
back’ the social history of which we are already aware” and that some of the
reports are “pretty vague.” Id.
239. Judges reported that test results “do not explain in layman terms” and
“do not explain numbers or scores and often are written for other psychological
experts . . . . and not for juvenile court judges.” Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/7

32

